ists in the French Congo and German capitalists in the Cameroons.

The decision of the Monis Cabinet to reconsider the railway agreement synchronized with rumours of a forward policy in Morocco, where civil war, tribal revolts and an empty exchequer had reduced the country to anarchy. Every one knew that the Sultan was incapable of keeping order. On March 13, 1911, Kiderlen-Wachter, who succeeded Schoen as Foreign Minister in 1910, uttered a warning to Jules Cambon. " German opinion might be excited, and it would be wise if Germany were informed in good time. By small successive operations France might be led on to an even more extended operation, which would end by annulling the Act of Algeciras." The Ambassador replied that French plans were not fixed, but that the Act of Algeciras would be respected. On April 4 he intimated that France would probably be forced to occupy Rabat, and Kiderlen replied that he was apprehensive of the effect of the news on German opinion. On April 19 Cruppi informed Berlin that in view of the danger to Europeans France had responded to the Sultan's appeal for aid by organizing a force for the relief of Fez, which was surrounded by rebels, and that a French column would be available if required to succour the capital. Bethmann now added his warnings to those of Kiderlen. Germany, he declared, had no reason to believe that the Europeans in Fez were in danger, though foreign military operations might provoke it. " You know German opinion on Morocco, and I must take it into account. If you go to Fez, you will stay there, and then the whole* Moroccan question will be raised, which I wish at all costs to. avoid. I do not say No, because I cannot assume responsibility for your compatriots, but I cannot encourage you. I can only

counsel prudence." "The Chancellor," reported Jules Cambon, " does not seek adventures in Morocco and only wishes to maintain Germany's economic interests ; not so the Pan-Germans. We must try to solve the problem without putting ourselves too much forward. I deplore the articles in our press on the Tunisification of Morocco, which are brought up against our official declarations."

William n was always a moderate in regard to Morocco. He had shrunk from wa£ in 1905-6, and in 1911 he was much less disturbed by French schemes than his advisers. " It will suit us quite well," he telegraphed from Corfu, ** if the French get tied up in Morocco with troops and money, and I think it